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Set Theory as the Unified Scheme for Physics
A.V. Novikov-Borodin
Institute for Nuclear Research of RAS, 60-th October Anniversary prospect 7a, 117312 Moscow, Russia
The process of cognition is analysed to adjust the set theory to physical description. Postulates
and basic definitions are revised. The specific sets of predicates, called presets, corresponding to the
physical objects identified by an observer during cognition are introduced. Unlike sets, the presets
are free of logical or set-theoretical paradoxes and may be consistently used in physical description.
Schemes of cognition based on presets are considered. Being different logical systems, the relativistic
and quantum theories, observations in modern cosmology cannot be consistently considered in one
‘unified physical theory’, but they are in frames of introduced schemes of cognition.
PACS numbers: 02.10.Ab, 12.10.-g
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INTRODUCTION
The set theory is a foundation from which virtually all
of mathematics can be derived. Since mathematics is a
language of physics, the so-called ‘unified physical the-
ory’, if exists, would also correlate with set theory. For
example, if sets are understood as any definable collec-
tions of objects, it looks quite suitable to consider the
physical systems as sets of physical objects, afterwards
one may consider the sets of the physical systems and
so on up to the general set including all physical objects
and systems, which would be the most general physical
system of the unified physical theory.
However, such ingenuous efforts to apply the set the-
ory to physical description meet set-theoretical paradoxes
similar to ones met by G.Cantor in his ‘naive’ set theory
[1]. Indeed, already the set of sets of physical objects
meets the Russell’s antinomy (see, for example, [2]), be-
cause it is exactly the ‘set of all sets that are not members
of themselves’ and it appears to be a member of itself if
and only if it is not a member of itself. Thus, a paradox.
Moreover, the ‘all including set’ corresponding to ‘unified
physical theory’ meets the Cantor’s paradox, according
to which, this set would be larger than itself, because by
definition needs to contain its own power set (the set of
all subsets) with higher cardinality. Thus, both a struc-
ture and an existence of the ‘unified physical theory’ are
under question.
To avoid paradoxes, the numerous axiom systems were
proposed for set theories, but it is not clear how they cor-
relate with the physical objects and theories and whether
it is possible to apply them to physical description at all.
Physical description has some specifics, because, unlike
mathematics, physics appeals to objective reality as a cri-
terion of truth. Thus, to avoid logical and set-theoretical
paradoxes in physical description, we will start from the
detailed analysis of the process of cognition of objective
reality in physics.
I. SCHEMES OF COGNITION
A cognition implies a separation on who is cognizing
and what is being cognized. In physics it is an observer
who is cognizing the physical surroundings, which is an
objective reality for him:
Postulate 1: The physical surroundings is an objective
reality for an observer being in cognition of it.
Using available methods of cognition P̂ : {P̂k} an ob-
server identifies a physical object a from the physical
surroundings R as a collection of distinctive properties
{pl} = {p} = P̂a, which are called a preset of predicates
and are exactly a model a of a or an object a correspond-
ing to a physical object a:
a = {p} = P̂a⇋ a ∈ R. (1)
Definition 1: An object is a collection of distinctive
properties called a preset of predicates, which is a
model of a physical object identified by an observer
in physical surroundings by means of available for
him methods of cognition.
If some predicates of a model A = {p} of a physical
object A ∈ R are interpreted by an observer as models
ai ⇋ ai ∈ R, so A is called a system and one has for it:
A = {p} =
{⋃
i
ai, f
A, rA
}
⇋ A ∈ R, (2)
where the predicates {fA} are the rules of collecting of
objects ai included in the systemA and r
A are some other
predicates. The rules of collecting {fA} unify objects ai
in the system A or interconnect them, so one may define
FA = {fA} as fields. To be interconnected, the objects
need to have the predicates conjugate with the fields.
Definition 2.1: A system is an object, in which some
predicates are identified as other objects called in-
cluded into this system containing them.
Definition 2.2: A field of a system is the rules of collect-
ing of objects conjugate with this field and included
into this system.
For example, the masses of the massive particles are
predicates conjugate with gravitational fields intercon-
necting particles into the gravitational system. The elec-
tric charges are conjugate with electromagnetic fields,
2the massive charged particles are conjugate with both
of these fields simultaneously.
Objects ai in Eq.(2) may be considered as systems Ai
containing one or more elements, so one can generalize
Eq.(2) for a system containing other systems:
A =
{⋃
i
Ai, f
A, rA
}
⇋ A ∈ R, (3)
what represents a process of cognition based on separa-
tion of objects from the physical surroundings and their
integration into systems by means of some rules {fA}.
Definition 3: A process of cognition is a main scheme
of cognition based on a separation of objects from
physical surroundings and on their integration into
systems by means of the rules of collecting, what is
a systematization of representations.
The system A in Eq.(3) contains the systems and may
be included in other systems, which, in their turn, may
contain and may be included in other systems and so on
up to infinity. Thus, we will call the process of cognition
open at the top and at the bottom, i.e. in macro-scale
of containing systems and in micro-scale of included sys-
tems.
The rules of collecting in the containing and included
systems may be different from each other, so it is hard to
use the main scheme of cognition for a large number of
physical objects and systems, what limits the possibilities
of cognition and prediction of events.
The process of cognition may be unified by introducing
the elementary objects and the fundamental fields :
Definition 4: The main scheme of cognition is called ba-
sic if any system in it may be represented by combi-
nations of elementary objects, which other objects
cannot be identified in, conjugate with fundamental
fields, which cannot consist of other fields.
Since the elementary objects pn and the fundamental
fields fm can represent any system, so all predicates relate
to elementary objects and fundamental fields, and the
specific predicates rA in Eq.(3) are predicates conjugate
with fields fl external to a system A:
A =
{⋃
n,m
{
pn, fm
}
, fAk , r
A(fl)
}
⇋ A ∈ R. (4)
There is no limitation for containing systems, but in-
cluded ones are limited by elementary objects, so a basic
scheme of cognition is open at the top and close at the
bottom, even if a number of elementary objects and fun-
damental fields is infinite.
The scheme of cognition will be close at the top, if there
is introduced a general system, which, if exists, contains
all identified objects and, therefore, cannot be included
in other systems. According to Eq.(3), one has for the
general system U :
U =
{⋃
k
Ak,C
}
⇋ U ∈ R, (5)
where C = {fU} is a field of the general system, and
specific predicates rU conjugate with external fields are
absent, because there are no fields external to the general
system by definition.
Definition 5.1: A main scheme of cognition is called
general if a general system containing all objects
and systems identified by an observer is introduced
in it.
Definition 5.2: A field of a general system is called a
pre-space.
A general system cannot be included in other system, so
it is close at the top and open at the bottom.
The scheme of cognition will be close both at the top
and at the bottom, if the general system, elementary ob-
jects and fundamental fields are introduced in it simul-
taneously.
Definition 6: The main scheme of cognition is called
unified if elementary objects, fundamental fields
and a general system also called unified are intro-
duced in it.
All systems in the unified scheme of cognition, includ-
ing the unified one, are completely determined on the
basis [pn, fm,C]:
U =
{⋃
n,m
{
pn, fm
}
,C
}
⇋ U ∈ R. (6)
Thus, there are introduced four schemes of cognition
in physics:
1. the main scheme open at the top and bottom;
2. the basic scheme close at the bottom;
3. the general scheme close at the top;
4. the unified scheme close at the top and bottom.
These schemes are based on a process of cognition and, it
will be shown later that all of them are used in physical
researches.
II. CONSISTENCY
Unlike mathematics, an observer in physics has a cri-
terion of truth: in accordance with Postulate 1, it is a
reality, which is objective for him, so one may define:
Definition 7: The representations and presets are con-
sistent and the predicates are noncontradictory, if
they correspond to objective reality on practice (at
an experiment).
A definition of presets looks not so general than sets,
because sets are understood as definable collections of
any objects, but presets are collections only of models of
physical objects, i.e. only of predicates determined by an
3observer. However, everything an observer may identify
in physical surroundings are physical objects, but he ex-
actly deals with his representations about these objects.
Moreover, presets include only determined properties of
physical objects, so exclude the indefinite ones out of con-
sideration. Exactly this ‘more general’ definition of sets
is a reason of uncertainties and a source of paradoxes in
set theories.
Assertion 1: The presets are the most general units in
cognition, and, unlike sets, are free of paradoxes.
Indeed, being predicates of predicates, the presets are al-
ways the ‘members of themselves’, so the Russell’s anti-
nomy for the ‘set of sets that are not members of them-
selves’ simply does not relate to presets. The Cantor’s
paradox for the ‘all including set’, which by definition
has to include its own power set, so has to have the car-
dinality higher than itself, is also eliminated for the ‘all
including’ preset, because it already contains the predi-
cates of all ‘physically existing’ interconnections between
objects (see Eqs.(2,5)) and includes all ‘physically ex-
isting’ subsystems, so coincides with its own ‘physically
existing’ ‘power preset’.
Thus, presets are free of paradoxes and a general sys-
tem may be consistently introduced with them. But how
complete are such representations? May a general system
contain all objects from physical surrounding, i.e. may it
be a model of the physical surroundings: U ⇋ R?
According to Definition 2.1 and Eq.(5), the general
system corresponds to the physical object:
U ⇋ U ∈ R, (7)
so if U ⇋ R then U ≡ R, i.e. a physical surroundings is
a physical object. But a physical object by Definition 1
is identified as something separated from surroundings,
so if a physical surroundings is a physical object, what,
in this case, is it separated from? Only a part may be
separated from a whole, so:
Assertion 2: Any general system based on the process
of cognition can represent only a part of physical
surroundings.
Thus, a general system may be consistently introduced
by presets, but it may correspond only to some part of
physical surroundings. It is fundamental limitation fol-
lowing from a process of cognition based on separation.
III. LOGIC OF COGNITION
Using an objective reality as a criterion of consistency,
one may also introduce a logic of cognition:
Definition 8.1: A logic is the generalized methods of
cognition, which lead to consistent representations.
Definition 8.2: A logical system is a general system,
which a logic is introduced in.
Being a general system, a logical system always rep-
resents only a part of physical surroundings, so one may
assert:
Assertion 3: A logical system is isolated in frames of
logic introduced in it.
Indeed, if an object a is not an element of a logical sys-
tem U , but logically interconnected with U , so U is not
general and is not logical. Thus, a contradiction. If a is
an element of U , but its interconnections with U differ
from logical ones, so U is inconsistent and not logical.
Thus, again a contradiction and an assertion is proved.
It immediately follows from an isolation of a logical
system:
Consequence 3.1: A logical system is self-consistent :
an observer, objects, fundamental fields and a pre-
space in it are consistently interconnected only with
each other.
Consequence 3.2: A logical system is self-defining:
‘general’ predicates of containing systems follow
from ‘partial’ ones of included systems defined in
frames of general ones.
A separation in a logical system is the getting partial
from general, while an integration is the getting general
from partial. In mathematics it is called a deduction and
induction correspondingly.
An introduction of elementary objects and fundamen-
tal fields in basic scheme is, in fact, a generalization of
a process of cognition, but in basic scheme the general
system is not introduced. In general scheme the rules of
separation and integration are not generalized, so only a
general system of unified scheme is a logical system:
Assertion 4: A logical system can be created only by
means of the unified scheme of cognition.
Since a logical system U is logically isolated, its logical
negation ¬U may be introduced. The region ¬U cor-
responds to an incognizable for U part of physical sur-
roundings, so a disjunction of U and ¬U corresponds to
the physical surroundings (see Figure 1A):(
U
⋃
¬U
)
⇋ R. (8)
Everything in physical surroundings has to be inter-
connected, because the ‘unconnected’, if exists, might not
influence an observer and could not be considered a part
of his physical surroundings R. For this reason, an exis-
tence of other ‘physical surroundings’ R1, R2, etc., un-
connected with R, is only a subject for groundless spec-
ulations:
Postulate 2: There is only one objective reality in
physics, which is physical surroundings.
The situation with the region ¬U is quite different.
From one side, a logical system U is logically isolated
from ¬U , but from other side, being the parts of the
4FIG. 1. Binary (A) and Multiple (B) Logical Systems in Cognition
physical surroundings, regions U and ¬U need to be in-
terconnected with each other. It means that the intercon-
nections between U and ¬U exist, but exceed the logical
ones introduced inside U .
If interconnections different from logical ones exist, log-
ical systems with different logic may also exist. Such dif-
ferent logical systems may correspond, for example, to
the same physical object U: U1 ⇋ U ∈ R or to differ-
ent object W: U2 ⇋ W ∈ R (see Figure 1B). Different
logical systems were first introduced in [3] as off-site con-
tinuums.
There is no reason to limit an amount of physical ob-
jects and logical systems, so:
Postulate 3: An infinite amount of different logical sys-
tems (i.e. general systems with different logic) may
correspond to physical surroundings.
It does not mean that the logical way of cognition is
useless. For example, though the cardinality of real num-
bers (ℵ1) is higher than of rational ones (ℵ0) and one can-
not express irrationals by rationals, one can approximate
any real number x with any accuracy ǫ by corresponding
rational number q:
∀x ∈ R, ∀ǫ, ∃q ∈ Q : |x− q| < ǫ. (9)
Thus, even if a logical system is logically isolated and
physical surroundings may be corresponded to many log-
ical systems, a logical way of cognition may be quite ac-
curate in predictions and useful in cognition.
IV. RELATIVISTIC THEORIES
In Euclidean geometry “that which has no part” is a
point, which in mathematics refers usually to an element
of some collection, called space, generally more or less
related to geometry.
Being inside this paradigm, classical relativistic theo-
ries: Newtonian physics, special and general relativities
understand a spacetime as a collection of points. All
points in a spacetime have spacetime coordinates.
Physical systems in relativistic theories are represented
by elementary objects and fundamental gravitational and
electromagnetic fields, and all of them are considered in
a spacetime. Elementary objects in a spacetime are also
points, because, otherwise, they would ‘have parts’ and
not be elementary. Elementary objects have mass and
charge and are sources of fundamental fields.
Thus, relativistic theories are systems of representa-
tions based on elementary objects, fundamental fields
and a spacetime, so are exactly in frames of a unified
scheme of cognition Eq.(6):
Assertion 5: Newtonian physics, special and general
relativities are logical systems corresponding to the
unified scheme of cognition.
An existence of the spacetime coordinates means an
arrangement of points, which predefines a consequence
of events, so predefines the cause-effect chains and a
causality in relativistic theories. To predict events, an
arrangement needs to be continuous, so space and time
in Newtonian physics, a spacetime in special relativity
and a spacetime manifold in the general relativity have
continuous axes of coordinates.
Theories are called relativistic, because a whole class
inertial frames of references {S}: S′, S′′, ... intercon-
nected with each other by Lorentz transformations are
equivalent for physical description. Generally speaking,
there may exist an infinite amount of classes of frames
{S˜}: S˜′, S˜′′, ... also interconnected with each other by
Lorentz transformations, but only one of such classes {S}
has physical meaning. It is a fundamental problem of so-
called ‘origin of inertiality’, which in relativistic theories
is unknown.
The detailed analysis of relativistic theories from the
point of view of introduced schemes of cognition gives
clear answer to this fundamental question. Indeed, unlike
a spacetime, a pre-spaceC of the unified system Eq.(6) is
not an arranged collection of points, but their intercon-
nections (Definition 2.2), i.e. an arrangement itself or a
5causality. Thus, inertial frames of references are equiv-
alent, because they have the same causality determined
by an interval ds′2 = ds′′2 = ... = ds2 and correspond
to the same pre-space C, so to the same causality in the
general system U(ds) = U , but considered in different
spacetime variables:
U(ds) = U ′(ds′) = ... ≡ U(C)⇋ U ∈ R. (10)
Since the relativistic theories are logical systems (Asser-
tion 5), they are logically isolated, so objects, an observer
and a causality, corresponing to class of frames {S}, are
interconnected in one logical system (Assertion 3, Con-
sequence 3.1). Other classes of frames {S˜} noninertial to
{S} correspond to different causalities, so are inconsis-
tent with logical systems of relativistic theories.
In some sense, Postulate 3 is an expansion of relativis-
tic principle onto different logical systems with differ-
ent causalities corresponding to different classes {S˜} of
frames noninertial to {S}. Nevertheless, to be realized,
any logical system needs to correspond to the physical
object (U or W on Figure 1) from physical surroundings.
Thus, one may assert:
Assertion 6: Any logical system is available for physical
description, if it corresponds to a physical object
from physical surroundings.
In general relativity an interval depends on the dis-
tribution of the gravitating masses over the spacetime:
ds2 = ds2(xµ), where xµ is the spacetime coordinates, so
the causality depends on the spacetime coordinates, and
a spacetime is a manifold:
U [ds(xµ)] ≡ U [C(xµ)]⇋ U ∈ R. (11)
The logical system in general relativity is also isolated,
so Eq.(8) is true for it: (U
⋃
¬U) ⇋ U. Physically, the
region ¬U in Newtonian physics and special relativity is
beyond a spacetime, and in general relativity it is beyond
a horizon of events, i.e. exactly beyond a causality deter-
mined by a pre-spaceC. In fact, different worlds, consid-
ered in modern physics behind the horizon of events of
the black holes, are different logical systems introduced
in Postulate 3. Of course, such worlds, if exist, are not
the only ones.
A logical isolation of consistent general system leads
to conservation of some integral characteristics of all in-
cluded objects and their interconnections. In general rel-
ativity it is expressed by a zero variation of actions of
matter Sm and of the gravitational field Sg:
δ(Sm + Sg) = 0. (12)
For example, a variation of this equation by the metric
tensor gµν leads to well-known Einstein’s field equations.
In modern physics a universe is usually understood as
‘all of spacetime and everything that exists therein’ or
as ‘the totality of existence, including all matter and en-
ergy’. After an introduction the different logical systems
these definitions look uncertain or even contradictory. In-
deed, ‘the totality of existence’ probably corresponds to
the physical surroundings R, while ‘all of spacetime’ to
the logical system U , which is not the same.
In fact, a universe is understood as everything available
for cognition, as a reality cognizable for observers. If
inertial observers are taking into account by default, so
a universe is identified with a logical system U . ‘Other
universes’ also considered in some physical theories are
called a multiverse.
According to expansioned relativistic principle (Asser-
tion 6), not only inertial observers need to be taking into
account, so:
Definition 9: A universe is a reality cognizable for ob-
servers.
Thus, a universe is an aggregate of logical systems (
⋃
Ui),
which form itsmulti-space structure. Such understanding
of a universe was proposed in [4, 5].
In some theories a universe is considered correlated
with a human brain: as a brain-like universe, as an exis-
tence of the consciousness in the world, as a Brain World.
In our approach, a universe looks like a brain because a
cognizable reality is a model of reality built by an ob-
server by means of available for him methods of cognition,
which is determined by his brain. In fact, a universe is
a reflection of the physical surroundings onto the human
brain.
A cardinality of a continuum in set theory is ℵ1 and of
its power set (the set of all subsets) is 2ℵ1 . The presets
correspond to objective reality, so includes not all possi-
ble, but all ‘physically existing’ subsets (see Section III),
therefore, a cognitive capacity of relativistic theories is
more than the cardinality ℵ1 of a continuum and cannot
exceed the cardinality of its power set 2ℵ1 .
V. QUANTUM THEORIES AND COSMOLOGY
In relativistic theories any system may be represented
by the combinations of the point-like elementary ob-
jects and fundamental gravitational and electromagnetic
fields, but the physical description of objects of quantum
physics are based on the wave functions, which are incom-
patible with such representations. Nevertheless, objects
of quantum physics are considered in a spacetime cor-
responding to the pre-space of the relativistic theories.
Thus, in quantum physics the general system is intro-
duced, but elementary objects are not used, so it is a
general scheme of cognition (Definition 5.1):
Assertion 7.1: Modern quantum theories (QM, QED,
QCD, ...) correspond to the general scheme of cog-
nition open in micro-scale.
Therefore, according to Assertion 4, quantum theories
are not logical systems, but transition schemes (Eq.(5))
for searching the new natural laws in micro-scale of in-
cluded systems.
Observations in macro-scale in modern cosmology also
look incomprehensible for relativistic theories. It is, for
example, the accelerated expansion of the universe, the
6velocity distributions in galaxies, the gravitational lens-
ing by clusters, the cosmic structure formation, etc. Cos-
mologists are trying to ‘explain’ such effects by intro-
duction of the new forms of matter: dark matter, dark
energy, etc. In fact, it is the efforts to stay on repre-
sentations of relativistic theories, so to be in frames of
the basic scheme of cognition. Indeed, even the efforts
to find ‘particles’ corresponding to new forms of matter,
for example, to dark matter, are nothing else but an ef-
fort to consider the new forms of matter as systems of
elementary objects and fundamental fields.
Assertion 7.2: Modern cosmology corresponds to the
basic scheme of cognition open in macro-scale.
Also as quantum theories, the cosmological models are
transition schemes for searching of new natural laws, but
in macro-scale of the containing systems. However, if, for
example, ‘particles’ of dark energy cannot be introduced,
so modern cosmology cannot be ‘explained’ in frames of
basic scheme of cognition, and the main scheme needs to
be used nevertheless. The question is: May cosmological
objects be ‘unified’ in one ‘physical theory’ in the future?
Or, more generally:
• Can relativistic, quantum theories and modern cos-
mology be unified in one logical system, i.e. in ‘uni-
fied physical theory’?
Assertion 8: Objects of relativistic, quantum theories
and of modern cosmology are from different logical
systems and cannot be considered in one ‘unified
physical theory’.
Since a pre-space is not a collection of points, but an
arrangement of objects, the elementary objects do not
need to be point-like. In mathematics there are known
the spaces quite different from collections of points.
For example, the functional spaces such as the Banach
or Hilbert spaces, where the norm, the distance and
the main operations like in Euclidean space are intro-
duced for functions of special kinds. Apart from the
classical Euclidean spaces, examples of Hilbert spaces
are spaces of square-integrable functions, spaces of se-
quences, Sobolev spaces of generalized functions, Hardy
spaces of holomorphic functions, etc.
Generally speaking, the physical object a ∈ R may be
represented in any space if some operators (i.e. methods
of cognition) Q̂ = {Q̂m} are introduced in it:
a(q) = {q} = Q̂a⇋ a ∈ R. (13)
When the object a = {p} = a(p) from Eq.(1) deter-
mined by methods P̂ corresponds to the same physical
object a, so:
a(p) = P̂a⇋ a⇋ Q̂a = a(q). (14)
Thus, it has to be some correspondence between a(p)
and a(q), and one may introduce a transition matrix Tlk
for discrete models a(p) = {pk} and a(q) = {ql} or a
transition function T (p, q) for distributions a(p) and a(q),
for which:
pk = Tklq
l, a(p) =
∫
q
T (p, q)a(q)dq. (15)
Here Tkl and T (p, q) need to satisfy to the conditions:
pk = TklT
lkpk and a(p) =
∫
q
dqT (p, q)
∫
p
dpT (q, p)a(p).
It may be, for example, the Fourier transformations
and the Fourier integrals (T (p, q) = ei2pipq, T (q, p) =
e−i2pipq) used for description of objects in quantum me-
chanics.
If three or more different logical systems correlated
with each other correspond to the same physical object:
a(p)⇋ a(q)⇋ a(r)⇋ ..., (16)
it is compatible for the QCD representations (see [5] for
details).
On practice, different logical systems both in macro-
scale of containing systems and in micro-scale of included
ones are observed from the point of view of relativistic
theories, so from the spacetime. Formally, to consider
the cosmological objects, one needs to add to Eq.(12)
the action SM corresponding to systems containing the
logical system of relativistic theories:
δ(Sm + Sg + SM ) = 0. (17)
Containing macro-objects influence to whole space-
time, so cannot be separated and identified inside it.
Such influence are usually interpreted as a vanishing of
the Ricci tensor: Rµν = Λgµν, where Λ is a cosmological
constant responsible for the expansion of the ‘universe’
‘explained’ by introducing the dark energy. Generally
speaking, an influence of containing objects may be dif-
ferent in different regions of the spacetime, so depends
on the spacetime coordinates xµ. Thus a cosmological
constant is only an approximation to: Λ = Λ(xµ) and it
is a main scheme of cognition.
Some included objects in the main scheme may be dif-
ferent logical systems, so their pre-spaces and causalities
do not need to be in frames of a spacetime of relativistic
theories. Indeed, spacetime representations are not ap-
propriate for objects of quantum physics and they may
also be not appropriate for some galaxes observed as ‘in-
cluded’ in our spacetime. In micro-scale the matter inside
objects of quantum physics seems ‘captured’ by strong
interactions. In macro-scale the matter inside galaxes
seems ‘attracting’ by the dark matter. Thus, the dark
matter and strong interactions correspond to observa-
tions of objects of included systems from the containing
one in macro- and micro-scales, while on the contrary
the dark energy corresponds to observations of objects of
containing systems from the included ones, i.e. from our
spacetime (see [5] for more details).
Thus, relativistic and quantum theories, observation
of modern cosmology may be successfully interpreted in
frames of introduced schemes of cognitions.
7CONCLUSION
To understand the reason of paradoxes in set theories
and to try to avoid such paradoxes in physical descrip-
tion, the process of cognition in physics were analysed.
The presets, which are specific sets of predicates corre-
sponding to the physical objects identified by an observer
during cognition were introduced. Unlike sets, the pre-
sets are free of logical or set-theoretical paradoxes and
may be consistently used in physical description.
Four schemes of cognition in physics were introduced
and considered: the main scheme open at macro-scale of
containing objects and at micro-scale of included ones;
the basic one close at micro-scale and open at macro-
scale; the general one open at micro-scale and close at at
macro-scale; the unified one close at macro- and micro-
scales. All of these schemes are used in physical descrip-
tion, but only the last one corresponds to consistent log-
ical system, so to consistent physical theory.
A general system may be consistently introduced by
presets, but cannot describe the whole physical surround-
ings, what is a consequence of a process of cognition
based on separation. A logical system is logically iso-
lated and the physical surroundings may contain an in-
finite amount of logical theories. Nevertheless, a logical
way of cognition may be quite accurate in predictions
and useful in cognition.
The objects of quantum physics and of modern cosmol-
ogy correspond to different logical systems and cannot be
described consistently in so-called ‘unified physical the-
ory’, but may be successfully interpreted in frames of
introduced schemes of cognitions.
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